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Abstract— the aim of this paper was to identify human errors 
in decision making process. The study was focused on a 
research question such as: what could be the human error as a 
potential of decision failure in evaluation of the alternatives 
in the process of decision making. Two case studies were 
selected from the literature and analyzed to find the human 
errors contribute to decision fail. Then the analysis of human 
errors was linked with mental models in evaluation of 
alternative step. The results of the study showed that five 
human errors occur in the evaluation of alternatives step; 
ignorance or neglect, overconfidence, underestimate, moral 
and fail to see, which led to un-achievement of objectives.  
 
Keywords: Decision making process, human errors, mental 
models, decision fail 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Undoubtedly decision-making is the most significant 
activity engaged in daily life, working environment, and all 
types of organizations at any level.  
A decision is defined as a moment, in an ongoing process of evaluating 
alternatives for meeting an objective, at which expectations about a particular 
course of actions impel the decision maker to select that course of action most 
likely to result in attaining the objective. (Harrison, 1998, p.5) 
 
Human always face with decision making in all activities 
including organizations.  According to McLaughlin (1995) 
Successful organizations ‘out-decide’ their competitors in at least three ways: 
the make better decision; they make decision faster; and they implement 
decisions more (page 443) 
 
As far as the organizations are concerned, one of 
characteristics of manager’s activity is taking decision 
(Harrison, 1998). In fact, Decisions are the core transactions of 
organizations. Therefore, the ‘quick right’ decisions are needed 
to achieve the companies goals. Paul C. Nutt (2002) who had 
been investigated 400 companies during 20 years concluded 
that half of decision made within business and organization 
failed. “…..the true failure rate maybe higher because failed 
decisions that avoid a public aiming are apt to be covered 
up” (Nutt, 2002). 
 
Ofstad (1961) presented that decision is falling into a series 
of behavioral reactions in favor of something, a certain action 
where there is no doubt and a judgment that should have 
made after several alternatives. Simon (1960) and Niland 
(1968) stated that decision is about selection and commitment 
to get the best action from several premises.  
 
Decision making is applicable for the organization 
activities, whether it is big or small organization, the needs of 
decision makers are essential. Then the decision making is 
become a generic process (Koontz 1969). 
 
Decision makers during the process of decision-making 
may not pay enough attention to some important factors, 
whether it is obvious or hidden. Ignoring these factors could 
cause making a decision with unwanted consequences. 
 
Different authors showed different processes in decision 
making. In general, they have similar point of view; 
problems, goals, alternatives, and finally, the action of 
choices. Simon (1960) stated three steps in decision making; 
finding occasions, finding possibility and choose of actions. 
Witte (1972) added information gathering in the first step of 
the decision making process to give a clear guide. The 
general process of decision making is also agreed by Schrenk 
(1969), Janis (1968), Eilon (1979), Fredrikson (1971) and 
Nutt (1989). Even though they continuously developed the 
former concepts to get the best one about decision making. 
According to Nutt (2002), 
The key cause of failure is the decision maker failure to see what they fail to 
see.  
 
The factors that drive the decision makers could be 
external or internal factors. Human error is the main cause of 
decision failure. In fact, all decisions will be made by 
personal judgment even if some kinds of methods had been 
used to make the decision. 
 
According to Peters (1966), Chapanis (1972) and Goldberg 
(1984), human error consists of any significant deviation 
from a previously established, required or expected standard 
of human performance. Senders and moray (1993) also 
considered “Human Error” as deviation from expected human 
performance. On the other hand, human being commit error 
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(Peterson, 1996), which is not because of they are wrong or 
dumb, but are caused by situations or conditions. These 
conditions will lead individual to err, which is faced with 
risks. Kletz (2001) has classified human errors into five 
categories: 
1. Errors due to a slip or momentary lapse of 
attention 
2. Errors due to poor training or instruction 
3. Errors which occur because a task is beyond the 
physical or mental ability of the person asked to do 
it, perhaps beyond anyone’s ability 
4. Errors due to a deliberate decision not to follow 
instructions or accepted practice 
5. Errors made by decision makers (managers) often 
due to a lack of appreciation of the part they should 
play 
 
The error is made as an action resulted by human mental 
work. Mental models show more about how people see how 
the world works (Forrester, 1971). This is influenced by 
people biases, values, learning, experiences and beliefs (Ford 
and Sterman, 1998; Norman, 1983; Laird, 1983; Forrester, 
1971).  
 
There are two steps when human receive information, 
namely information gathering and processing (Flemming, 
1985), these are: 
I. Information Gathering   
Information gathering is done by using Intuition, which 
involves knowing without knowing how you know (Jung 
C.G, 1971). The intuition often cannot explain or 
discover how to gather data (Levesque, 2001). Intuition 
is usually called as instinct, something that can give 
direct understanding of a situation without any apparent 
rational thought or evidence (Adair, 2002). Intuition is 
needed according in gathering data which has to be 
improved, and then intuition can lead to much valuable 
information and guidance for decision making (Adair, 
2002).  
 
II. Information Processing 
 Information Processing contains two mental models 
elements. These are thinking and feeling.  
 
Thinking is needed to perform our belief and to achieve the 
goal in the decision making (Baron, 2000). Here, thinking 
begins with doubts, then to eliminate or even remove these 
kinds of doubts; search is needed to reach the inference 
(Newell and Simon, 1972; Baron 2000). Thinking or thought 
is defined as a mental process, which allows modeling the 
world, and so to deal with it effectively according to their 
goal, plans, ends and desires (Baum, 2004; Shain, 1995).  
 
Human feeling also can play a key role in the information 
processing. Feeling has emotion and moods as the elements. 
Emotion has partial part in decision; let’s say that emotion is 
making decision without thinking. Thus, emotion makes 
effective decision and empowers relationships (Duxbury and 
Anderson, 2000). Nussbaum (2001) stated that emotions are 
essentially cognitive states of a subject. According to Baron 
(2000) 
 
A state that is subjectively experience as pleasant or unpleasant, that drives or 
motivates certain kind of behavior specifics to the emotion, and that tends to 
be elicited by a certain kind of situation (page 59) 
 
Differ from emotion, the condition of moods will influence 
human feeling and can be traced to informative functions of 
feelings (Schwarz, 1990). Sad mood will draw on a 
systematic, data-driven, bottom-up strategy of information 
processing with extensive attention to detail. Happy mood 
will fall back on preexisting general knowledge structures, 
using a top-down, heuristics strategy of information 
processing with a smaller amount attention to detail 
(Davidson and Sternberg, 2003; Bless and Schwarz, 1999; 
Schwarz and Clore, 1996).  
 
2. MENTAL MODELS AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
Generally, to make a decision is often difficult because of 
uncertainty and conflict within the process. (Shafir, Simonson 
and Tversky; 1993) The errors will be occurred in decision 
making, no matter whether they are avoidable or un-
avoidable errors. 
 
On the basis of Isenberg (1984) and Decision Making 
Process presented by Harrison (1998), Nutt (1989), Eilon, 
(1979), Witte (1972), Fredrikson (1971), Schrenk (1969), 
Janis (1968), Simon (1960) a mental model and decision 
making process can be presented as shown in figure 1.  
 
The input of the process is information flow. This 
information is then processing in two ways, whether the 
mental models will filter it, or it could be changing the 
mental models (Isenberg, 1984). The received information 
then will be analyzed by decision makers using their mental 
models; in order to acquire several alternatives. Then these 
several alternatives are evaluated to achieve the goals. The 
result of this process is final conclusion, namely as decision.  
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Evaluation of the alternatives is the step before taking a 
decision. The decision makers will compare the alternatives 
based on certainties or uncertainties of cause-effect 
relationship and the preferences of the decision makers for 
various probabilistic outcomes (Harrison, 1998).  
 
Basically, there are three modes that decision makers 
follow to evaluate the alternatives. These are judgment, 
bargaining and analysis. As shown in Figure 2, in Judgment 
Mode; the decision makers arrive at choice based on 
experience, values, perception and intuition (Harrison, 1998). 
While in Bargaining Mode; the decision maker is seeking 
alternatives that allow the attainment of objectives as part of 
compromise among concern parties in situation where 
external forces dominate or the choice promises to be 
controversy (Linblom, 1959). Differed with these two modes, 
in Analysis Mode; the decision maker evaluate the 
alternatives carefully and objectively while a choice is finally 
make to maximize utility (Mitzberg, Raisinghani and 
Theoret, 1959). In fact, these characteristics are different with 
different people. Therefore, a tool is needed to help the 
decision maker to decrease his/her dependency from 
subjective judgment and evaluation. This tool should be 
implemented by a team. To obtain this goal hazard 
identification procedure e.g. What-if, Hazop or FMEA could 
be an appropriate tool. In this case and due to team working, 
judgment will be more objective than subjective. In addition 
analysis could be more rationalized. 
 
The main problem with the evaluation of alternative by 
decision maker is hazards, as the potential for error, exist 
with the judgment, the bargaining and the analysis. The main 
hazards exist with these modes during the evaluation and the 
recommendation to improve the process is given in Figure 2.  
                  
Figure 2. Modes and Hazards in evaluation of the alternatives 
 
Considering Mental Modeling and Decision Making 
Process, in order to reach to a reasonable decision, the errors 
as hazard should be identified and eliminated. In doing so, 
some of the most important research questions are: 
1. What could be the problems with collection relevant 
and sufficient information? 
2. What could be the problems with perception? 
3. What could be the problems with analysis of 
information and searching for alternatives? 
4. What are the human errors as the potential of the 
decision failure in evaluation of alternatives? 
This study is focused on research question 4. The main 
objective is to identify the human errors, in evaluation of 
alternatives, through analysis of some decision failures 
selected from the literature. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To perform the study, deductive and inductive both are 
common way. An inductive approach generates a theoretical 
assumption from empirical discovers while a deductive 
approach verifies a theoretical assumption by testing the 
theory in reality (Yin, 1994). In this study, these two 
approaches are combined as recommended the best way for 
research by Dubbois and Gadde (2002). 
 
The study started from literatures review, based on articles, 
books, and Internet sites. The aim was to grasp concepts of 
decision making, human error and mental models.  
 
The research question and objectives were the point of start 
to do literature searching in order to extend keywords and 
search terms. The study was conducted in order to: 
 
• Get a systematic understanding and grasp of the basic 
theory of human errors in decision making  
 
• Analysis of decision making process. Each step in 
decision making process was analyzed to get better 
understanding about the whole process. 
 
• Two cases of decision failure were selected from the 
literature (Nutt, 2002) to see what have been the main 
causes of error in the decision makings. The selected 
cases were analyzed by means of Hazop study to identify 
the key criteria/uncertainties and also the possible 
deviations related to these criteria in evaluation of the 
alternatives. 
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• A framework (Figure 3) was developed to identify the 
causes including human errors leading the failure of the 
decision. Fish bon diagram was chosen for cause–effect 
analysis in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Framework of Study 
 
 
Hazop Method was introduced to analyze the evaluation of 
alternatives based on modes. The use of Hazop analysis will 
be helpful in assessing effort to find possible solution that 
could be useful and never thought before. There were 
identification of the uncertainty parameters, the deviation 
guidewords and unwanted scenarios leading decision failure. 
 
Based on hazop identification, the weaknesses and strengths 
were compared. And then cause-effect analysis was done by 
means of fish bone diagram. As a final point, human error 
was resulted. 
 
 
4. CASE STUDIES 
Two cases, EuroDisney and Shell Brent Spar, were selected 
from the literatures for the analysis. 
A. EuroDisney 
The Disney Empire is one of the icons that are valuable in 
the market. The idea of theme park came up in 50s. The 
gigantic success gained by two Disney Parks in California – 
established 1955 and Orlando – established 1971 led Michael 
Eisner to build the first overseas park in Tokyo, Japan, 1983. 
In Tokyo, a great success achieved that meant the theme park 
could be readily exported. The enthusiasm of European, 
especially Britannia to come to US to visit Disney Park also 
one of the reason to build the theme park in Europe, and it 
would be a way to achieve another great successful story 
about Disney Empire. 
 
To realize this plan, two hundred possible locations within 
Europe has been analyzed, but then deducted to two 
alternative options, Spain (Barcelona) and France (Paris). 
The approaches did by French Government attract Michael 
Eisner. The cheap and abundant land, economical loans, links 
of good transportation; road and rail, to the park and the tax 
breaks as well were the interesting points were offered by the 
French Government motivated Eisner to choose Paris as the 
location of new theme park. This new theme park 
“EuroDisney was opening on April 1992. Eisner expected to 
get the same success with Tokyo Disneyland. Disney 
consultant firm, Arthur D. Little projected the visitor’s 
attendance would be in range of 11.7 millions to 17.8 
millions in the first year. But, the big expectation went 
wrong. The first year, Disney lost $960 millions with rate of 
lost $ 1 million per month. In 1994, Disney lost $400 
millions. 
 
• Analysis of the decision  
  The decision that has been taken by EuroDisney decision 
makers after evaluation and comparison of two alternatives 
was Paris, France. This decision is taken even though there 
were some weakness points. 
In order to evaluate the decision taken in site selection, 
Hazop study was applied. Five criteria/uncertainty factors 
were identified. These are: 
- Market 
- Weather 
- Government concession 
- Accessibility 
- Culture 
 
Success of the project in terms of profitability (S) is 
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defined as: 
 
S=f(Customer satisfaction(Cs), Market(M), Government concession(Gc)) 
 
And, 
 
Customer satisfaction=f(Culture©, Weather(W), Accessibility(A)) , 
 
Therefore,  
 
S = mC + nW + oA + pM + qGc 
 
Where m, n, o, p, q are the weight factors. 
 
Culture and weather play a very important role in 
customer satisfaction and accessibility could have a high 
score when being supported by culture and weather. 
 
Government concession could effect on project 
profitability. But, it cannot guarantee the attendances, 
especially when the culture and the weather are not in the 
favor of the customers. On the side, government concession 
could not stay as a stable factor. It may change by changing 
of the government policies or the rules. 
 
On the basis of Hazop study five important unwanted 
scenarios leading to decision failure/economic loss of the 
project have been found. Theses are: 
a. Less/no attendance due to competitor in similar 
branch 
b. Less/no attendance due to improper weather 
c. Less/no attendance due to customer un-satisfaction 
caused by the dominated culture 
d. Less/no attendance difficulties to reach the park e.g., 
because of jam traffic. 
e. Inability to keep the government concession on due 
to changing the policies and the rules 
 
Considering the criteria and the unwanted scenarios, it 
could be found that Paris was not the best choice. The 
points of strength and weakness of each site is given in 
Figure 4.  
 
EuroDisney decision makers put their subjective 
consideration in their judgment with economical issues, in 
terms of Government Concession, as their priority more 
than others. In fact, the French Government offered very 
good concession compared to Spanish Government. This 
priority made EuroDisney decision makers ignored impacts 
of the weaknesses.   
 
Locations Strength Weakness 
 
 
Barcelona, Spain 
 
Weather Superiority 
Potential Customers 
Spanish Cultures 
 
 
Accessibility 
Government 
Concession 
 
 
Paris, France 
 
Accessibility 
Government Concession 
 
Weather 
Superiority 
Potential 
Customers 
French Cultures 
 
Figure 4.: Strengths and the weaknesses of the alternatives 
 
In fact, these weakness points led to blunders, which 
forces Disney decision makers to take some remedial 
decision that also led to fail. For example, after decision is 
taken, decision makers tried to solve weather problem by 
indoor building design. This design later became bottleneck 
for the EuroDisney to attract more customers, which 
resulted in much less attendance than the projection has 
been made by Arthur D. Little. Not only for the weather 
points, had the ignorance about culture differences also led 
to blunders. For instance, Disney did not allow alcohol 
within the park as well as the picnic. This showed how 
Disney did not consider about European culture to drink 
alcohol and bring the food to the park. In addition, some 
problems came from EuroDisney local employee that 
unwilling to speak English and wear Disney dress code.  
 
Undoubtedly, the ignorance and neglect of the weakness 
points in decision making process made possible negative 
outcome. The judgment of EuroDisney based on Eisner’s 
feeling that influenced by Disney theme park successful 
experiences, big expectation to get the same success and 
over confidence for the new Disney Theme Park in Europe.  
 
 
B. SHELL BRENT SPAR 
The Brent Star was taken out of operation in 1991 after 
about 15 years service in the Shell/Esso Brent Field in the 
northern North Sea – The UK’s biggest source of oil and gas. 
A very large floating oil storage and loading buoy, the Spar 
had stored from the Brent “A” platform and acted as a tanker 
loading facility for the whole of the Brent Field. 
 
It was unlike almost any other installation in the North 
Sea. Like an iceberg, most of its bulk - mainly six huge 
storage tanks - lay beneath the water's surface. At 14 500 
tonnes, the Spar weighed about the same as two thousand 
double-decker buses. It was longer than a football field 
floating on its end, and its huge tanks displaced 66 500 
tonnes of water - a capacity that meant they could hold the 
equivalent of almost four Big Bens. Its size had serious 
implications for moving it around - apart from the waters to 
the North of Orkney, most of the North Sea was too shallow 
to accommodate it.  
   
While the Spar was fit for the purpose for which it was 
designed, calculations of its structural strength under various 
stresses showed that the original installation process could 
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not simply be reversed. Raising it up out of the water in its 
vertical floating position, or attempting to rotate it to the 
horizontal, both posed a significant risk to its structural 
integrity. This was mainly due to its intrinsic design, and the 
need to maintain, during movements of this kind, the balance 
of internal and external pressures to stop the tanks' walls from 
buckling and imploding. This challenge was further 
complicated by the fact that two of the Spar's six storage 
tanks were damaged during operation 
 
Shell UK’s original thoughts were to return the Spar to 
shore for disposal, but the more this was studied, the more 
difficulties were uncovered. The challenge had never 
primarily been one of dealing with waste or the actual process 
of scrapping, both of which would have been manageable 
once the Spar reached the shore. Here lay the fundamental 
challenge - getting the Spar out of the water or even just 
raising it higher without posing undue risk to people or the 
environment, would require an exceptional feat of civil 
engineering.  
 
Based on the unique characteristics of the Spar and its 
surrounding waters, Shell UK proposed two choices at the 
first hand which are listed below:  
Deep Sea Disposal (DSD)  
1. Tow the Brent Spar to the North Atlantic. 
2. Use the explosives to sink the platform. 
3. Allow the structure to settle on the sea bed. 
4. Technically the easiest option 
 
On-shore dismantling   
1. Tow the Brent Spar into a deep harbor. 
2. Decontaminate the structure and reuse the 
materials. 
3. Dispose of the waste on land.  
4. Technically more complex and with a greater 
hazard to the workforce.   
 
Among these options, horizontal dismantling and deep 
water disposal were considered in detail to determine the Best 
Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) for disposal. Shell 
reasons for choosing the deep sea disposal are given in Figure 
5. 
 
Engineering 
complexity 
Sinking the Brent Spar is more 
straightforward than the on-shore 
dismantling option. 
Safety of the 
workforce 
The deep sea disposal posed fewer 
hazard to the workforce than the 
dismantling option.  
Environmental 
impact 
Sinking would only have a localized 
impact in a remote deep sea region 
Acceptability 
Deep sea disposal had the approval 
of the UK government and regional 
authorities.  
Cost Sinking the Brent Spar is the cheapest option.  
Figure 5. Reasons of Choosing DSD 
 
Although, the selected option was approved by UK 
Government and regional authorities, the project never 
started. Because Greenpeace reacted fiercely, claiming that 
the project will impact on environment. This reaction was 
supported strongly by the society. Shell realized that the 
power of angry society and its economic consequences had 
been underestimated during alternative selection. Shell was 
forced to find an optimum solution to get rid of the crises.   
 
The final decision was using the Spars’ hull to build a quay 
extension at Mekjarvik near Stavanger in Norway. The 
project was approved by UK Government. The project was 
effectively completed in July 1999 when cut and cleaned ring 
sections of the buoy’s hull were placed on the sea bed at 
Mekjarvik, to form a base of a new quay. The consequences of 
the decision failure were about four years delay, expending 
£60 millions instead of £21.5 millions as the original 
estimation for dismantling project, and loosing of millions of 
Dollars due to the society reflections in UK and the other 
parts of the region. 
 
• Analysis of the decision  
In order to identify the scenarios leading failure of 
decision made by Shell, a Hazop study was carried out. The 
most important uncertainty factors found in this study 
were: 
a. Technical operation complexity 
b. Structure integrity 
c. Social and independent environmental institutions 
attitudes 
d. Project operation time 
 
In our study two main scenarios have been identified as: 
1. Loss of human life due to: Accident caused by 
technical operation complexity; poor analysis, 
planning and control in operation; structural 
problem during operation.  
2. Economy losses due to: Accidents due to complexity 
and poor control of operation, extra time, resources, 
and energy needed as a result of operation 
complexity, delay in operation or changing an 
alternative to another one as a result of: 
3. Poor analysis of environmental impacts,  
4. Poor communication with / or neglecting social and 
independent environmental institutions. 
 
Comparing these alternatives, Deep Sea Disposal (DSD) 
has more advantages than Onshore Dismantling (OSD). 
The weaknesses of On-shore Dismantling option are: 
a. Higher complexity of operation due to the demand 
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in: 
- more work 
- longer operating time 
- more man-power 
- heavier machines to operate vertically 
b. Higher probability for occurring accidents and 
human losses due to higher complexity of the 
operation  
c. Higher probability of structural failure due to 
rotating, vertical and horizontal movements 
d. Higher environmental problems due to higher 
probability of structural failure and operating on 
coastal area 
e. Higher cost of operation due more human resources, 
more time consuming, more capital, and more 
energy needed  
f. Higher cost of responses to environmental accidents 
due to possible impacts on coastal area 
 
Considering these weaknesses it could be found that the 
decision taken by shell in selecting the Deep Sea Disposal 
was a correct one. However, this decision has weakness in 
environmental impact evaluation that later became a 
critical point for some negative consequences. In fact, even 
though the environmental impacts had been confirmed by 
some experts but it is not enough to make this decision 
acceptable for all parties. Shell fully believed this solution 
was the best solution to carry out the Brent Spar disposal, 
but they paid no attention to the public’s reaction. The 
consideration only taken from the company’s point of view 
that is Deep Sea Disposal has minimum impact to the 
environment. The judgment had been made, actually, 
influenced by self-awareness and perception that this will 
be accepted naturally by all parties.  
 
 
C. Human Errors Analysis 
Analysis of alternative evaluation in the process of decision 
making in the selected cases showed that negative 
consequences resulted by decision failure achieved due to 
human errors. There are errors made by human in decision 
making process that were caused negative consequences as 
the results. The analyzing of human errors in these two case 
studies has used visual mind. Mental models that have been 
used in these two case studies are thinking and feeling, which 
are falling into evaluation of alternatives step. The thinking 
and feeling in this step manifested to human errors, which are 
here identified.  
 
On the basis of cause-effect analysis, using Fish Bon 
Diagram, possible causes of error have been identified. 
 
Human errors in this step could be categorized in five 
based on analyses of evaluation of alternatives, decision 
analysis and the consequences.  
 
• Ignorance or Neglect 
Roughly said, ignorance is omission to obtain knowledge 
which one may acquire and it is duty to have. Decision 
makers often ignore or neglect some factors, whether they 
are obvious or hidden. This could be because of human 
experience, human values, human perception or human 
intuition. In EuroDisney case, Disney’s experiences in 
preceding success of Orlando, US, and also in its first 
overseas theme park in Tokyo, Japan, make EuroDisney 
decision makers truly believe there are no big barriers will 
be faced. Big expectation to have the same success is the 
main goal which made the EuroDisney decision makers 
ignored some weakness in their decision analysis which 
actually was critical points in their achievement of the 
objectives. For instance, the ignorance in weather condition 
and culture differences even though they had been analyzed 
these points as the weakness of location in Paris which 
later became the main causes of the blunders in 
EuroDisney. 
 
On the other hand, Shell Brent Spar case has different 
part where the decision makers ignored some points. The 
Shell decision makers ignored the public feeling which 
they should have to pay more attention because their 
decision about Deep Sea Disposal would impact not only 
for Shell but also for the community. The ignorance about 
public feeling later was followed by Green Peace campaign 
and public protest as the negative consequences of the Deep 
Sea Disposal decision.  
 
• Over Confidence 
Over confidence is feeling of exaggerated trust in 
someone or something, which is in decision making 
process, especially in evaluation of alternatives, will lead to 
decision fail as well. In EuroDisney case, the decision 
makers felt overconfident to gain the same success or even 
spectacular success because of their previous success in 
Orlando and Tokyo. These successes made the decision 
makers trust with their capabilities to establish the next 
overseas theme park in Europe. The high projection had 
been made to achieve their goal as well as management 
hubris.  
 
In another case of Shell Brent Spar, decision makers 
fully believe with their estimation in environmental 
impacts of Deep Sea Disposal because of long time and 
money to do analysis and evaluation. The confirmation 
from some experts in this field also contributes to their 
trust for their own assessment.  
 
But later both of the decision makers who felt truly 
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believe with their judgment because of overconfidence had 
to face with their failures in decision. 
 
• Underestimate 
The less estimation of true or actual value can be defined 
as underestimate, which often take part in decision making 
process. Underestimate of some factors that actually should 
be taking more attention by decision makers will bring 
about negative consequences. It can be seen in EuroDisney 
case, which the EuroDisney decision makers 
underestimated in tickets prices at the beginning of the 
EuroDisney projection and then when it put into practice it 
faced with some problems, such as less attendance. The 
same problem also faced in Shell Brent Spar, where the 
decision makers underestimate the impacts in environment 
even though they spent time and money to do analysis. 
Definitely, this error initiated to decision fail.  
 
 
• Fail to see 
Decision makers need to consider about hidden factors in 
decision making process. The inconsideration about hidden 
factors make decision makers fail to see some elements that 
should be take into account before making decision. In fact, 
decision makers often realize about this when the negative 
outcomes faced. This condition can be seen in EuroDisney 
case, where the decision makers never thought about 
another US theme park can be their competitor. This is due 
to the fact that people prefer to flight to Orlando that is 
cheaper with good weather condition. In addition, the 
economic recessions also blew up and never being thought 
by EuroDisney decision makers.  
 
As well as EuroDisney case, the Shell decision makers 
also had some unexpected problems as a result of indirect 
impact of Deep Sea Disposal. This is illustrating how the 
decision makers did not have back up plan that they should 
predict before they came up with Deep Sea Disposal. 
Obviously, the inconsideration about possibly factors or 
hidden factor will end in negative consequences as the 
result of decision fail. 
 
 
• Moral 
People have different principle about right or wrong. 
The differences in moral thought in decision making 
process need more attention. It is not only from one 
decision makers’ perspective but also needs to think about 
other perspectives outside of the organization when the 
decision is made. When EuroDisney decision makers 
thought about their ethics of not allowing alcohol and 
picnic based on Disney principles, they forgot to 
contemplate the European thought about alcohol. The same 
dilemma also occurred in Shell Brent Spar, where the Shell 
decision makers kept confidential some problems of Deep 
Sea Disposal because of they thought company’s secret. 
This is totally different with public opinion, which needed 
transparency. Thus, the principles in thought about right or 
wrong in decision making process can create the blunders 
when the implementation of decision is taken.  
 
In conclusion, two case studies, EuroDisney and Shell 
Brent Spar illustrated contribution human error in decision 
fail obviously. In both cases, decision makers with all of their 
abilities and capabilities still could not generate the good 
decision because of the errors occurred from the beginning 
and just realized in implementation process. Definitely, the 
EuroDisney and Shell decision makers could not achieve their 
final goal that they had been stated from beginning or even 
though they can achieve it but after a lot of remedies in their 
decision.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Human errors play an indispensable role in the decision 
fail both in the case of Euro Disney and Shell Brent Spar. 
Five errors in the mental model of decision makers were 
spotted in the step of alternative evaluation in the decision 
making process. These five errors all resulted in the 
unachievement of original objectives, either directly or 
indirectly. Ignorance or neglect some problems in decision 
making process, certainly initiate in decision fail with 
negative outcomes as the final consequences. The ignorance 
is related with overconfidence where the decision makers has 
high trust feeling about something that is supported by their 
experiences or knowledge, values, perception and etc, which 
on the other hand, make the decision makers underestimate 
for a small stuff or even fail to see some hidden factors. The 
judgment influenced by these mental factors and makes it 
possible to have blunders. Besides these errors, human 
thought about right or wrong also needs to take into account, 
because of the differences for every person thought about this.  
 
The combination of these errors arise because of a lot of 
things that come from human mental which is influenced 
their thinking and feeling. It is not simply to avoid this kind 
of errors, but also it is not impossible to minimize them. 
Understanding about human error in decision making process 
which is related with mental models parts will make decision 
makers carefully within their process and will be readiness for 
any kind of negative outcomes or even unexpected outcomes. 
Finally, the understanding is not enough without 
improvements in decision makers’ mental model, because it is 
needed to minimize those kinds of errors.  
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6. RECOMMENDATION 
Since the human errors identified come from the mental 
model of human beings, it is difficult to avoid them. However, 
it is quite possible to minimize negative impacts from them 
through improving mental models of decision makers. It 
needs further studies in term of human error from mental 
models perspectives that is combining in decision making 
process, because of their contribution in decision fail.  
 
In this case, further studies can be undertaken to identify 
the methods that could be possible to use to improve human 
mental models.   
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